Background

Stalemate in the War

The Gallipoli campaign, in which New Zealand made its first major effort during the First World War, had its origins in the stalemate which had developed on the Western Front by the end of 1914. Following the initial free-flowing operations, the opposing sides found themselves facing each other along a line of trenches which stretched from Switzerland to the Belgian coast. The power of the defence having already made its impact felt, statesmen in both camps were at a loss as to how to proceed. In these circumstances the need for an alternative approach was patent.

British Strategy

On the Allied side the search for an alternative was encouraged by the opportunities presented by superior seapower. With the German High Seas Fleet contained in the North Sea, the possibility of launching amphibious attacks on the enemy was particularly evident to the British First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. Impatient to use British naval resources, he advanced a series of proposals, among them an assault on the Dardanelles-the nearly fifty-kilometre-long strait separating the Aegean Sea from the Sea of Marmara, which at its narrowest point, the Narrows, was less than two kilometres wide. The object would be to pass a force into the Sea of Marmara and threaten the capital of Germany's ally the Ottoman Empire.

Constantinople's Vulnerability

Constantinople, which guarded another narrow waterway, the Bosphorus, into the Black Sea, was very vulnerable to seaward attack. Such action had precedents: in 1807 a British squadron had forced the Narrows only to be becalmed and eventually forced to retreat before it could attack Constantinople. As recently as the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12, an Italian force had attacked the Dardanelles and penetrated as far as the defences of the Narrows. Even before the Ottoman Empire entered the war on 31 October 1914, the possibility of a Greek-Russian assault on the Dardanelles had been canvassed.

Once hostilities began, Churchill had wasted no time in ordering a bombardment of the forts guarding the Narrows. This operation, carried out before Great Britain formally declared war on the Ottoman Empire, merely reminded the Turks of the threat to the Dardanelles, and impelled them to improve the defences, especially by the laying of minefields.

Strategic Importance of Turkey

In London strategic issues were from November 1914 in the hands of the War Council, whose chief members were the Prime Minister, H.H. Asquith, the Secretary of War, Lord Kitchener, and Churchill. The last-named urged an attack on Gallipoli at its first meeting on 25 November. This was rejected-pre-war studies had indicated that such an operation would be too risky-but the issue was soon brought back to the foreground by developments in the war.

With the Turks advancing northwards in the Caucasus, Russia appealed for action to relieve the pressure. The need was fleeting-Russian forces soon drove the Turks back-but impetus had been given to Churchill's concept of an attack on Turkey. The tempting idea of inducing the Balkan states to join the Allies and attack Austria-Hungary from the south-east, never more than an illusion, was also influential. A campaign in the Eastern Mediterranean might, moreover, encourage Italy to enter the war on the Allied side.

These considerations were reinforced by the limited nature of the intended action. Despite the strong reservations of the commander of the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron (Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden), Churchill proposed a naval attack on the forts guarding the Narrows. His plan had the attraction of not requiring any substantial military forces for its implementation. Nor would it entail any diminution in Britain's naval position in the vital North Sea, since only older battleships would be used. The War Council approved the proposal on 15 January 1915.

Initial Naval Attack: February–March 1915

Navy Breaches Outer Defences

The naval attack began on 19 February. Despite delays caused by bad weather, the outer defences, based on forts on both European and Asian coasts at the entrance to the strait, had been overcome within a week. Attention then switched to the intermediate defences, consisting of minefields guarded by batteries of mobile field guns and howitzers.

In London meanwhile the War Council had agreed to provide some military forces to support these operations: on 15 February it decided to send out the 29th Division, the only regular division not committed to the British Expeditionary Force in France. Churchill also despatched the Royal Naval Division, a hotchpotch of Royal Marine and other units raised from surplus sailors. Later, when the decision to send the 29th Division was reversed (temporarily as it transpired), it was decided to deploy to Mudros on the Aegean island of Lemnos the Australian and New Zealand troops which had, since December, been training in; because of a lack of transport, only one Australian brigade was deployed for the time being.

The French government, meanwhile, had also decided to deploy to Mudros a specially composed division. All these troops were regarded as garrison forces which might occupy the forts (and later Constantinople) when the naval attacks had been successfully completed. A military assault on the Dardanelles was not envisaged. General Sir Ian Hamilton was appointed to command the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, as these disparate forces were designated.

Limitations of Naval Attack

By the time that Hamilton arrived in the Eastern Mediterranean on 17 March, the slow progress of the naval operations had raised doubts about the likelihood of success by these means alone. A sustained attempt to subdue the forts and guns guarding the intermediate defences was made on 18 March, but this proved disastrous when six of the sixteen capital ships taking part struck mines, and three were lost. The minefields remained as a barrier to progress. Within four days the commanders on the spot, Hamilton and Vice-Admiral John de Robeck (who had replaced Carden on 16 March), had shifted the emphasis of the operations from a purely naval to a military orientation, a change in which London eventually acquiesced.

Land Attack Proposed

An opposed landing was now proposed, with a view to capturing the Kilid Bahr plateau. From here the positions on both sides of the strait dominating the sea approaches could be neutralised, allowing the naval operation to proceed. The forces at Hamilton's disposal, about 75,000 strong, were not in any state to carry out such a plan immediately, such an eventuality not having been foreseen.

Allied Force Gathers in Egypt

So that the necessary arrangements could be made, the French division, the Royal Naval Division, and the 29th Division were all transported to Egypt, where all but one brigade of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General William Birdwood, were still located. The ANZAC comprised the 1st Australian Division (Major-General W.T. Bridges) and the composite New Zealand and Australian Division commanded by 1NZEF commander Major-General Sir Alexander Godley, which included the New Zealand Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General F.E. Johnston).