Hamilton's Complicated Plan

In the southern part of the front at Anzac, the trench system offered no more prospect of a breakthrough than at Helles. However, in the rugged terrain at the northern end of Anzac the front was less clearly defined. It was marked by a series of outposts. The possibility of outflanking the Turks through this area was recognised at an early stage by Birdwood.

While the futile attacks continued at Helles, Hamilton began preparing an offensive at Anzac, using further reinforcements which the Dardanelles Committee on 7 June had agreed to provide. These amounted to three additional divisions, to which Kitchener added two more late in the month, bringing the number deployed to a total of thirteen divisions. During July London's commitment to Gallipoli increased, as a consequence of the disasters which befell the Russians at the hands of the Austro-German offensive launched on 13 July.

Hamilton's plan envisaged two columns advancing on to the Sari Bair Range, with a view to capturing the key high points of Chunuk Bair, Hill Q, and Hill 971 (Koja Chemen Tepe) during the night of 6/7 August. A diversionary attack by the Australians would distract Turkish attention from the assault. At dawn on the 7th, an attack launched by the New Zealanders from Chunuk Bair in conjunction with an Australian attack from Russell's Top against the heavily fortified position at the Nek would complete the capture of the whole ridge as far as Hill 971.

It was another complicated plan, requiring strict adherence to timetables to pull it off. With no room at Anzac for further troops, Hamilton determined to use his additional forces, grouped as IX Corps, by landing at Suvla Bay, to the north of Anzac, as well. This operation was initially conceived in terms of supporting the assault on the Sari Bair Range. However. the intervention of the lacklustre and timid IX Corps commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Stopford (a long-retired officer who had been foisted on Hamilton by Kitchener because of his seniority), ensured that the establishment of a base became the primary objective, with support of the assault on the Sari Bair Range left dependent on the situation.

Initial Attacks Fail

The offensive opened on 6 August with diversionary attacks at both Helles and Anzac's Lone Pine. Predictably, the former was a costly failure. While savage fighting at Lone Pine (seven Australian VCs were won here) did induce the movement of Turkish reserves, this proved counterproductive, for the troops so moved were better placed to intervene on the Sari Bair Range when that position's importance became apparent.

As soon as night fell, two covering forces moved out to capture the foothills through which the assaulting columns would move to secure their objectives. On the right, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and Otago Mounted Rifles had secured their objectives by 1 a.m. The plan thereafter came unstuck. Proceeding up separate deres (valleys), the two elements of the right assaulting column, which consisted of Johnston's New Zealand Infantry Brigade and an Indian mountain battery, were supposed to rendezvous on Rhododendron Spur before moving up on to the summit of Chunuk Bair. At dawn Johnston was still waiting at the Spur for part of his column to come up; when ordered to attack immediately he did so half-heartedly and was repulsed by the comparatively weak Turkish forces on the summit.

Meanwhile the left assaulting column, made up of British and Indian troops, had also failed to seize its objective after becoming lost in the rugged terrain in the darkness. Although the timetable had thus been completely thrown out, the planned dawn attack at the Nek went in even though there was to be no converging attack from Chunuk Bair. The 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade was in effect sacrificed by Birdwood in the forlorn hope that the attack might help the assaulting columns up on to their objectives by distracting the enemy.

Chunuk Bair and Hill Q Gained and Lost

The overall plan had depended upon speed, to ensure that the troops on the summits could consolidate their positions before the Turks could deploy their reserves in response. The delays had fatally compromised the whole offensive, though on the 8th a glimmer of hope was provided when Johnston's column found Chunuk Bair unoccupied and the Wellington Battalion moved quickly on to the summit. But the position was enfiladed by Turks on other high points, and after dawn they prevented significant reinforcements getting up to join the Wellingtons. Not until after dark did the Otago Battalion and the Wellington Mounted Rifles join them.

A further attempt to seize Hill Q was made on 9 August, but once again the whole enterprise was fatally compromised by a lack of coordination. Even so, a small force of Gurkha soldiers managed to reach the top of Hill Q, but were unable to consolidate their position before falling back after being hit by friendly naval gunfire.

By this time the weight of Turkish pressure was beginning to make itself felt, as reinforcements arrived. In desperate fighting, the New Zealanders on the summit of Chunuk Bair held off the Turks for two days. But on 10 August a massive Turkish counter-attack settled the issue. The British battalions which had relieved the New Zealanders on Chunuk Bair the previous night were swept away. The British forces on the approaches to Hill Q were also driven back.

These physical problems were compounded by the psychological pressures stemming from the consciousness that no place in the tiny perimeter was safe from artillery fire. With the Turks overlooking them, snipers were an ever-present hazard.

The seizure of the summits of Chunuk Bair and Hill Q were impressive tactical achievements, and the Gurkha and New Zealand troops involved distinguished themselves by their steadfastness at a critical moment. But by the time the summits were gained, it was already too late: Turkish reserves were converging on the area in numbers that spelt doom for the whole enterprise. There was no chance of the British getting sufficient forces up on to these positions (even if they had been immediately available), and supplying them, in time to consolidate the positions before the inevitable Turkish counter-attack.

Even if the positions had been held, it is by no means certain that the Allies could then have pushed on towards the Narrows: the ANZACs themselves had proved that troops holding the high ground could face difficulties in dislodging determined defenders.

Why the Sari Bair Offensive Failed

In reality, the outcome of the offensive had been determined by the failure to secure the Sari Bair heights on the first night, but the performance of IX Corps underscored the failure. Two divisions were ashore by midday on 7 August, but, despite limited resistance from Turkish forces in the vicinity, they failed to take decisive action to seize the commanding heights in the area. When they did finally move forward to do so, they were forestalled by hastily deployed Turkish reserves.

To be sure, Stopford's orders had emphasised the establishment of a base, but his lack of drive was apparent and he was soon replaced. The conditions in which the British troops found themselves also played a part in the failure to seize the opportunity presented by the successful landing. Godley bemoaned the fact that all that had been gained at Suvla was 'five hundred acres of bad grazing land'.